

Looking at Left and Right the Right Way: Multiple Dimensions and Electoral Outcomes

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Abstract

Political conflict is often multi-dimensional. I show that using a single dimension for describing political competition in such circumstances is inappropriate, and suggest a straightforward modification. I present a two-dimensional model of electoral competition, and use this model to analyze the most recent presidential elections in three European countries: France, Romania, and Ukraine. These three cases are useful because they satisfy both conditions for natural experiments which enable me to assess the impact of each of the two dimensions: an institutional condition (majority-runoff presidential elections), and a helpful “nature” (different ideological pairings of candidates in consecutive elections). When trying to account for the results of recent elections in the three cases, the predictions of a one-dimensional model of competition are inferior to those of a two-dimensional model. This being the case, I can show that the competitive space of these countries is indeed two-dimensional. While the applicability of the model is limited to polities satisfying the conditions for this natural experiment, the more general point is that we must look at electoral dynamics in order to understand electoral competition.

Looking at Left and Right the Right Way: Multiple Dimensions and Electoral Outcomes

Is political competition one-dimensional or multi-dimensional? Many students of politics continue in the Downsian tradition of looking at politics as one-dimensional (left versus right). Whether they do this because they think it is an accurate description of political competition (Downs 1957), or merely use a one-dimensional model because they think it is a useful assumption to make for deriving predictions (e.g., Kitschelt 1992; 1995), such a model can be challenged if its predictions are less accurate than those based on a two-dimensional model. Indeed, electoral alignments in Eastern and Western Europe over the last decades have rendered a one-dimensional assumption less and less tenable. Downs (1957, p. 116) recognized the problems associated with the mapping of the extreme right on the left-right continuum. Under the new conditions of the emergence of important extreme right parties in various polities across Europe, parties whose position on economic issues is often centrist or even leftist, maintaining a one-dimensional view not only misrepresents the ideological space, but also leads to inaccurate forecasts of election results.

This paper examines this claim with evidence from three cases: France, Romania, and Ukraine). The evidence suggests that in each of these cases a one-dimensional model is unsatisfactory not only in terms of its explanatory power, but also in terms of its predictive power. That is, a one-dimensional model fails to capture the richness of their competitive politics and, furthermore, the predictions derived from such a model are unsatisfactory, failing the test of empirical confirmation.

Instead, I present a simple model of two-dimensional electoral competition and show that this model does better than a one-dimensional model in describing their

competitive space. In addition to the classical left-right or economic dimension there is a second, political dimension, which is orthogonal to the first one and separates a libertarian-cosmopolitan constituency from an authoritarian-nationalist constituency (the substantive content of this second dimension is different in the case of Ukraine). I back this two-dimensional model with survey data which enables me to map the main constituencies in these countries. I show that such a model is superior to a one-dimensional model in terms of its explanatory power, offering a more accurate description of the competitive spaces of these polities. Furthermore, when applied to the last presidential elections in each of the three cases, the predictions derived from a two-dimensional model are superior to those of a one-dimensional model.

Political Competition: One- or Multi-Dimensional?

Downs' 1957 book "An Economic Theory of Democracy" is the first clear example of analyzing political competition using a one-dimensional framework.¹ Downs assumed that a one-dimensional model is a reasonably accurate description of political competition, and therefore we can "reduce all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in the economy should there be?" (1957, p. 116). When we apply this model, all voters and candidates (or parties) can be assigned a position along the left-right continuum, and each voter will choose the candidate that is closest to his/her ideal point.

One problem with Downs' one-dimensional model is that it offers no clear prediction about the position of an "extreme right" party on economic issues. Left, center, and (moderate) right parties are labeled as such based on their economic program. But we use non-economic criteria² to label a party as "extreme right." Downs himself

acknowledged the problem: “parties designated as right wing extremists in the real world are for fascist control of the economy rather than free markets” (Downs 1957, p. 116).

For practical purposes, the accurate mapping of extreme right parties (and the related question of whether one dimension is enough for this purpose) was less of a problem in the 1950s, when Downs was writing his book. At that time such parties appeared all but extinct and had little impact, electoral or otherwise. Nonetheless, this issue became more relevant in recent decades, when we saw a resurgence of parties labeled as “extreme right” in many Western European polities.

If we assume that there are “elective affinities” between the economic and political dimensions, then whether we map these parties starting with either economic or political considerations makes no difference. Kitschelt (1995) takes this position in *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. He argues that, in addition to the “old politics” of primarily economic conflicts, advanced industrial democracies are characterized by “new politics” cultural conflicts (Kitschelt 1995; see also Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2002). Nonetheless, political competition is still essentially one-dimensional: instead of the old left-right dimension, the new axis of conflict has become left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian. The convergence of the moderate left and the moderate right toward the center in recent years has created a niche for the extreme right (or radical right, in Kitschelt’s terminology). To be successful, the extreme/radical right must combine authoritarianism with an endorsement of free market capitalism.

The French National Front “comes close to an ideal-typical realization of [...] the ‘New Radical Right’ or new right-wing authoritarianism” (Kitschelt 1995, p. 91). According to Kitschelt, the National Front and its electorate is not only more

authoritarian than the moderate right; it is also more pro-capitalist. If that is the case, the crushing defeat of Le Pen in the last French presidential runoff can be interpreted as either a rejection of his politics or his economic positions (or a mix of both). But, let us suppose that the National Front's position on economic issues is to the left of the mainstream right. In this latter scenario, if economic considerations were important in deciding the outcome of this election, Le Pen's share of the vote in the second round should have been much larger than it was.³

So, what is the true ideological placement of the French National Front and its constituency? French scholars argue that it is the latter; that is to say, it endorses centrist economic policies. Although the National Front started as a staunch supporter of the free market, it gradually abandoned this position as its electorate became increasingly working-class in composition (Roy 1998; Ivaldi 1999). Survey data from the 1988 presidential election indicates that Le Pen's electorate was already "much less economically liberal⁴ than voters for Jacques Chirac and even Raymond Barre" (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1993, p. 49). The extent to which this process was supply-driven (a strategic move for gaining blue-collar votes) or demand-driven (a response to the increase in working class support) is an interesting question. Either way, though, the consequence is the same. Both the demographic profile of National Front constituents and, to a lesser but significant extent, the economic policies endorsed by the party increasingly resemble those of the "old left".

The French political space is no longer one-dimensional. Instead, it has become two-dimensional. On the economic dimension, "the extreme right electorate [is] not to the right but to the left of the moderate right on a left-right continuum [...] Attachment to

economic liberalism is certainly not one of the main reasons for voting for the extreme right” (Grunberg & Schweisguth 2003a, pp. 332-6). Thus, the specificity of the French extreme right comes exclusively from its position on the second dimension (Grunberg & Schweisguth 1997; Mayer 2002; Ivarsflaten 2003). This second dimension, “having to do with attachment to or hostility toward universalist values, [is] primarily what very strongly distinguishes the extreme right from both the moderate right and left” (Grunberg & Schweisguth 2003a, p. 334).

The impact of the second dimension made the last French presidential runoff (May 2002) unlike the previous ones (1988 and 1995). In terms of the ideologies involved, “a typical French second round presidential election is fought between candidates from the centre-left and centre-right who tend to be evenly matched” (Benoit, Laver & Sauger 2003, p. 2). The 2002 runoff was of a completely different type, a clash between two worldviews, so that it is more aptly described as “A referendum, rather than a presidential election” (Ysmal 2002).⁵

Romania and Ukraine are two polities that, similarly to France, had referendum-like elections in recent years, reflecting the importance of a second competitive dimension in shaping their politics. All these polities have the three key ingredients for a natural experiment: (i) a two-dimensional competitive space, (ii) majority-runoff presidential elections, and (iii) different ideological pairings in consecutive runoffs. I will look in each of the three countries at two consecutive elections and assess the effect of one dimension in one election and then do the same with the other dimension in the following election. By doing this, I am able to show that a one-dimensional model is

unsatisfactory for describing political competition in these polities, therefore requiring a two-dimensional mapping of their constituencies and party systems.

Presidential Elections in France, Romania and Ukraine: Three Natural Experiments

I will first compare the electoral consequences of multiple competitive dimensions in France and Romania, showing the similarity of these dimensions in the two cases. This similarity in terms of dimensions is matched by similar effects in terms of the structuring of political competition. I then discuss political competition in Ukraine and show how a two-dimensional competitive space leads to analogous effects, notwithstanding the nature of its second competitive dimension, which has a different ideological content (primarily authoritarian/libertarian conflicts in the first two cases, as opposed to ethno-linguistic divisions and conflicts over state building in the latter).

We can think of France and Romania as most-dissimilar cases. Even though the French transition from an advanced industrial society to a post-industrial society is very different from the Romanian transition from a relatively backward socialist economy to a post-socialist economy, some of the consequences of these processes are similar. Economic marginalization is not confined to either the less or the more developed countries. Blue-collar workers constitute an important part of the workforce in both polities, and they find themselves increasingly marginalized and incapable of coping with recent economic transformations in either country.⁶

The politics of the two countries reflects these problems. The social and ideological profiles of the French and the Romanian extreme right-wing constituencies are very similar to one another, yet quite distinctive from the mainstream left and right in each polity. Both constituencies are close to the median voter in their respective country

on economic issues, while at the same time occupying an extreme position on the second dimension. The constituents of both parties are more xenophobic, more authoritarian, and more hostile toward politicians and democracy than other constituencies.⁷ Not surprisingly, this extreme position has similar consequences for electoral competition in the two countries. When the leaders of these parties qualified for the second round of presidential elections, these runoffs became an “authoritarians against everyone else” affair.

Two-dimensional electoral competition in France

Figure 1 offers a summary of the results of the CEVIPOF survey⁸ of the 2002 French presidential and parliamentary elections (see the analyses in Grunberg & Schweisguth 2003a; 2003b).⁹ I use Grunberg & Schweisguth’s results to map the moderate left, moderate right and extreme right constituencies in a two-dimensional space.¹⁰ The horizontal dimension represents the economic or left-right dimension. The vertical dimension is a composite measure indicating various non-economic (or “political”) attitudes.¹¹ It is the mean of four scores capturing authoritarianism, xenophobia, anti-Europeanism and anti-democratic attitudes.

Figure 1

On the horizontal (economic) dimension, the extreme right constituency is located halfway between the moderate left and the moderate right constituencies (and its score on this dimension equals the national mean). It is on the vertical dimension that the extreme right constituency does indeed appear extreme. On issues such as favoring the reintroduction of the death penalty, expressing hostility toward the EU, thinking that there are too many immigrants in France, and that democracy is not working well in the country, the mean score of this constituency is 82 percent, almost twice the mean of the

moderate right (44 percent). These results confirm that the National Front's constituents share the average French voter's views on economic issues, but at the same time they are clearly distinguishable from other constituencies in terms of their position on the second dimension. This gives further credence to the interpretation that the 2002 runoff had little to do with the first dimension, and was mostly about the second, and that voters themselves regarded this vote as a referendum rather than an election.

It is important to note that there was relatively little change in the intrinsic salience of the two dimensions in 2002 compared to their salience in previous presidential elections (1988 and 1995). As Grunberg & Schweisguth point out, both economic issues (the first dimension) and non-economic issues (the second dimension) were important in structuring the attitudes of French voters as early as 1988. The correlation between these two dimensions was weak; pro-market attitudes were a good predictor of the vote for the moderate right, while authoritarian and xenophobic attitudes were predicting support for the National Front (Grunberg & Schweisguth 1993, pp. 45-64). In the 1988 presidential election "the most relevant cleavage [was] not the one dividing the left and the right but the one that separates the extreme right from the left and the moderate right" (Mayer 1993, p. 33).

This stability at the attitudinal level is matched by stability at the partisan level. The increase in the level of support for the extreme right candidate in the first round of the 2002 presidential election was less than two percentage points compared to the first round of 1995 and less than three points compared to the first round of 1988.¹² The one thing that has prevented the 2002 runoff from resembling previous runoffs (i.e., having two moderate candidates and a roughly even division of the vote) was the less than one

percentage point separating Le Pen (16.86) from the socialist leader Jospin (16.18). Thus, we can view these elections as constituting a natural experiment where everything else is controlled for, and the only major difference between the “control” group (the 1988 and 1995 elections) and the “treatment” group (the 2002 election) is the different ideological pairings of candidates present in these runoffs.

Finally, the ideological mapping of extreme right constituents, matched by that of the National Front, indicates that “welfare chauvinist” may be a better label for this party than “extreme right” (or “radical right”).¹³ Both welfare chauvinist and radical right parties are authoritarian and xenophobic, but they are separated by their views on economic issues. Radical right parties are strongly pro-capitalist, while welfare chauvinist parties are not. Kitschelt hypothesized that whether a polity has a significant welfare chauvinist or a radical right party is essentially a function of its level of economic development: “due to increasing affluence in advanced industrial capitalism, the potential target groups for welfare chauvinist appeals are also quite limited. Authoritarian, ethnocentric, and anticapitalist appeals are likely to fall onto much more fertile ground in less affluent postsocialist societies” (Kitschelt 1995, p. 23).

In hindsight, it appears that Kitschelt has underestimated the chances of success of this type of party in a country like France. The National Front’s shift toward a welfare chauvinist position has significant consequences for the overall French party system, making it similar to Romania’s party system along the two dimensions. The next section confirms Kitschelt’s hypothesis in the case of Romania, a post-socialist society with a very successful welfare chauvinist party.

Another case, similar dimensions: Romania 1996 & 2000

In this section I analyze political competition in Romania during the last two presidential elections. I look at survey data to map the economic and political attitudes of its three core constituencies (left, right, and extreme right or welfare chauvinism) in a two-dimensional space. After that, I present exit poll data to show how social differences translate into distinctive patterns of partisan support. The analysis indicates important similarities between the Romanian and the French party systems. It also helps to explain a puzzle of electoral politics in Romania: the apparent vanishing relationship between regional development and aggregate support for the left in the last presidential runoff.¹⁴ Figure 2 illustrates where Romanian constituencies stand on economic and political issues.

Figure 2

The mapping of Romania's core constituencies in a two-dimensional space is similar to that of France's constituencies (Figure 1).¹⁵ As it was the case in France, we see the leftist and rightist constituencies divided primarily by their position on economic issues. On this dimension, the extreme right or welfare chauvinist constituency (voters of the Greater Romania Party) is located in an intermediate position.

It is on the vertical dimension that the Greater Romania Party and its constituents appear clearly distinctive from all other parties and constituencies. Like their French counterparts, these voters are more authoritarian, more xenophobic, and have less sympathetic views about democracy and Europe compared to either the left or the right constituencies. These results are confirmed by a recent study (Krauss 2002) that focused specifically on the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and party preference among Romanian voters. The author found that authoritarian attitudes were unrelated to

support for the left, negatively related with support for the right, and positively related with support for the Greater Romania Party.

The left, right, and extreme right constituencies occupy distinctive locations in the two-dimensional space. They also have very distinctive patterns of support across social groups. Figure 3 presents the relationship between education and vote in the first and the second round of the last presidential election in Romania (December 2000):

Figure 3

If we use education as a proxy for class and compare the support for left and right in the first round as a function of education level, what we see is an illustration of “old politics,” with the right as the party of the haves and the left as the party of the have-nots. The data shows a strong, negative relationship between education and vote for the leftist candidate and a strong, positive relationship between education and vote for the two rightist candidates. Finally, the relationship between education and support for the extreme right candidate is non-linear: his level of support among voters with vocational training was twice than that among the group at the either end of educational attainment (people with elementary education and people with higher education, respectively).

These results suggest the potential for interesting cross-constituency alliances. The 2000 presidential runoff is of particular significance, since it matched the leftist leader of the Social Democratic Party against the leader of the Greater Romania Party. In the previous two runoffs (1992 and 1996), both matchups were between the same leftist candidate and rightist candidate. These results offer us the setting for a natural experiment, such that we can observe the effect of the horizontal, economic dimension in 1996 and the effect of the vertical, libertarian-authoritarian dimension in 2000.

Table 1

Table 1 reports models of aggregate (county-level) support for the leftist candidate in the first and second rounds of the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections as a function of regional development, measured through the county's Human Development Index.¹⁶ In addition to this, I include two control variables, ethnic composition (percent of ethnic Hungarians) and region (a dummy variable for Transylvania).¹⁷ The results show a strong, negative relationship between development and vote for the leftist candidate in all elections except the last presidential runoff. For one standard deviation¹⁸ increase in the value of HDI, the model predicts a .23 standard deviation decrease in the leftist vote. This strong, negative relationship between development and leftist vote, still visible in the first round of the 2000 elections, suddenly disappears two weeks later in the runoff, when the coefficient for development becomes statistically and substantively insignificant.

We can look at the results of the two consecutive first rounds (1996 and 2000) as measurements in a treatment group and a control group. The comparison of these results enables us to reject the hypothesis that there was a change in the underlying support for the leftist candidate, since the negative relationship between development and leftist vote is observable in both cases. The same negative relationship between leftist vote and development is visible in the first runoff (1996) but absent in the second runoff (2000). Then the most plausible explanation for this change is the "treatment," that is, the pairing of the leftist candidate with an authoritarian candidate in the second runoff rather than a rightist candidate as it was the case in the first runoff.

Why does the relationship between development and support for the left wash away in the 2000 runoff? One potential explanation, plausible at face value, is that voters saw little difference between the two candidates. There is some indirect empirical support for this interpretation (the Social Democrats and the Greater Romania Party have been allies in a previous government between 1992 and 1996). If this interpretation is correct, then voters from less developed counties had an equal liking for the two candidates, and voters from more developed counties had an equal dislike for them. We see no difference between less and more developed counties in the aggregate, and the coefficient for development becomes zero, as it is in Table 1.

Nonetheless, Figure 3 provides a different explanation. Voters *did* see a clear difference between the two candidates. As a matter of fact, the leftist candidate increased its share of the vote among voters with higher education (the core rightist constituency) fourfold from what it was two weeks before; support for the authoritarian candidate barely changed among this group of voters. This bears a striking resemblance to what happened in France in 2002, and we can explain it in the same way: for rightist voters, the extreme right is not an acceptable substitute. Therefore, for this group the 2000 runoff became a referendum on democracy.

In spite of what the aggregate results seemed to suggest, the relationship between development and vote in the 2000 runoff was as strong as ever. Nonetheless, this time it was non-linear, due to the unusual cross-class alliance supporting the leftist candidate in this election. His support was highest among voters with the least amount of education as well as among voters with the highest amount of education. In the aggregate we see no

difference between various counties, irrespective of their level of development, since an increase among one type of voters compensates for a decrease among another.

Ukraine 1994 & 1999: different dimensions, still similar model

Ukraine is a polity in which the distribution of cleavages and core constituencies is significantly different from the one we saw in France or Romania. Nonetheless, the broad setting is the same (two competitive dimensions, majority-runoff electoral institutions, variation in the ideological pairings in two consecutive runoffs); we can thus apply the same model and compare the two runoffs to assess the effect of the “treatment”.

Just as in France or Romania, Ukraine’s first competitive dimension is economic; unlike in France or Romania, its second dimension refers to nation-building and language policies, pitting Ukrainian-speaking nationalists against Russian-speaking Russophiles (Birch 2000, pp. 68-9; Miller & Klobucar 2000, pp. 678-84). Mapping these two constituencies in a two-dimensional space offers the key to a puzzle of electoral politics in Ukraine: when we compare the models of the vote for presidential candidate Leonid Kuchma in the 1994 and 1999 runoffs, one model is the mirror image of the other. In the 1994 runoff Kuchma’s constituency was similar to that of the Russophile, anti-economic reform, Eastern-based Communist Party. In the 1999 runoff it was similar to that of the Ukrainian-speaking, pro-reform, Western-based nationalist right:

Table 2

On economic issues, Kuchma’s opponents in both elections were to his left (Birch 2000, pp. 94-5; Hinich, Khmelko & Ordeshook 2002). Thus, a one-dimensional mapping of the three candidates along the left-right continuum cannot account for this change in the model of his vote from one election to the next. The key to this variation is the three candidates’ position of the three candidates along the vertical, nationalist dimension. In

the 1994 election, Kuchma's opponent was then-incumbent President Kravchuk, a moderate Ukrainian nationalist. In the 1999 election, his opponent was Simonenko, the leader of the pro-Russian Communists, a party for which making Russian the second official language is a core element of its official program:

Figure 4

In the 1994 runoff, neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma was the ideal candidate for either the core nationalist constituency or the core Russophile constituencies. For each of the two constituencies, one of the two candidates was closer to its ideal point on the economic dimension and the other candidate was closer on the nationalist dimension. So this was a perfect setting to observe how powerful this second, nationalist dimension is in shaping Ukrainian politics. The nationalist democrats were in favor of democracy, market reforms and state building. Nonetheless, if they had to make a choice, they were "willing to put economic and democratic reform on the back burner in order to pursue their primary goal, building a strong Ukrainian state" (D'Anieri, Kravchuk & Kuzio 1999, p. 59).

In 1994, "Kravchuk successfully diverted attention from his mismanagement of the economy to transform the presidential election into a second referendum on independence" (Kuzio 1997, p. 43). As a consequence, in the 1994 runoff neither the right-wing nationalists nor the left-wing Russophiles voted based on their preferences on economic policies. If anything, both voted the way they did *in spite* of these preferences. That explains why the model of Kuchma's vote in this election resembles that of the Communist party rather than that of the rightist Yushenko Bloc, in spite of his reformist credentials. One study indicates that "the correlation between language and voting

behavior in the [1994] presidential election was 0.92 and Kravchuk therefore lost because Russian-speaking Ukrainians voted for Kuchma” (Kuzio 1997, p. 42).

Kuchma’s opponent in the 1999 runoff was the leader of the Communist party. Therefore, it is not surprising that his vote in this election is similar to the model of nationalist party list vote in 2002 (Table 2). This means that in 1999 he was closer to the ideal point of the nationalist constituency on both dimensions. It is his pattern of support in 1994 that cannot be accounted for by comparing his position and that of his opponent on economic issues. Only when we look at the vertical, nationalist dimension, and observe the change in his relative position on this dimension from 1994 to 1999, does the change in his model of support start to make sense.

Conclusion

In this paper I have presented a simple model describing electoral competition in the two-dimensional ideological space of three polities, France, Romania, and Ukraine. In the first two cases, I mapped their extreme right constituencies on a welfare chauvinist position, which helped me to better account for the outcomes of the last presidential elections in both cases. In France, this confirmed the fact the result of the 2002 runoff was determined by non-economic considerations.

The last two presidential elections in Romania offer an almost ideal setting for running a natural experiment and assess the impact of its two dimensions. I began by noting a puzzle: the sudden vanishing of the relationship between level of development and aggregate support for left in the 2000 presidential runoff. The mapping of Romania’s core constituencies in a two-dimensional space suggested a solution to this puzzle and, finally, individual-level data confirmed the accuracy of this interpretation.

Ukraine offered a final example of a case in which we must view electoral competition as two-dimensional. If we map all the three candidates competing in the 1994 and 1999 runoffs along a single, economic or left-right dimension, we see that Kuchma's opponents in the two elections occupied very similar positions. Nonetheless, his model of support in one runoff is the mirror image of his model of support in the next. It is difficult to account for this outcome with a one-dimensional model, but the task becomes easy if we think of Ukrainian politics as two-dimensional. It is the relative change of Kuchma's position on the second, nationalist dimension that accounts for the change in his model of support from one runoff to the other.

In this paper I have focused on three cases which satisfy my natural experiment conditions. However, they are exemplary of a broader phenomenon. Scholars looking at other cases make the same point, namely, that politics in those polities is multi-dimensional. The central feature of Schofield et al.'s account of political realignments in the U.S. is that "[its] politics necessarily involves two dimensions of policy" (Schofield, Miller and Martin 2003, p. 217). In addition to the economic dimension, there is an equally important social dimension; hence, realignments are "the direct consequence of the unrecognized two-dimensionality of the [American] political space" (Miller and Schofield 2003, p. 245).

Ostiguy's work on Argentina (1997; 2002) is another example of a case where we have to look at politics as two-dimensional in order to understand its patterns of party competition: "Argentina's party system is structured as a double political spectrum [...]. The Peronism/anti-Peronism cleavage has a meaning that extends beyond [...]. programmatic or policy differences [...]. It is for this reason that Peronism and anti-

Peronism have repeatedly leapfrogged each other on the left-right axis, without fundamentally altering the party system” (Ostiguy 2002, p. 1).

Political conflict tends to be multi-dimensional. Runoff elections reduce a two-dimensional competitive space, making it one-dimensional. In any particular runoff, only one of the dimensions is activated, largely as a function of the candidates who are running. The model presented in this paper helps us to assess the impact of multiple dimensions by analyzing their effect in consecutive elections, one dimension at a time. While nature is not always so generous to provide us with natural experiments, the more general and important point of this paper is that reliance on cross-sectional data in analyzing electoral competition is inappropriate. In order to gain an accurate understanding, we must look at electoral dynamics.

Notes

¹ Hotelling's 1929 article, though focusing on economic competition, can be considered a precursor of Downs' analysis.

² Husband (2001, pp. 11087-8) lists the following features as characteristics of extreme right ideology: (i) selective inclusion; (ii) selective exclusion; (iii) racism; (iv) anti-Semitism; (v) preference for authoritarian initiatives by a strong state; (vi) the cult of a leader; (vii) preference for a hierarchical social order; (viii) antisystemic and antipluralist political perspectives; (ix) overt hostility to political opponents; (x) low tolerance for social change; (xi) nostalgia for the past.

³ In the first round of the election, the incumbent president Jacques Chirac was first with 19.88 percent of the total vote, and Jean-Marie Le Pen was second with 16.86 %. Le Pen barely increased his share of the total vote in the runoff (17.79 %). If the National Front's true location on economics is in between the mainstream left and mainstream right, and voters made their decision primarily on this criterion, then Le Pen would have been the Condorcet winner in 2002, closer to the median French voter than either the incumbent President Chirac, the candidate of the mainstream right, or the Socialist Prime minister Jospin, the candidate of the mainstream left.

⁴ The term "liberal" is employed throughout this paper in its classical or European meaning. That is to say, liberalism is an ideology promoting freedom and non-interventionism in social as well as economic realms.

⁵ According to a CSA/France 3 survey, a majority (56 percent) of those who voted for Chirac in the runoff have indicated the rejection of the other candidate among the most significant considerations driving their vote. The program of the candidates came a

distant second, with only 31 percent of Chirac's constituents mentioning it ("Les critères de choix pour le second tour présidentielle," Sondage exclusive CSA/France 3/France Info, www.csa-fr.com/fra/dataset/data2002/opi20020424a.htm).

⁶ "In both [less developed countries] and advanced industrial countries, the productive system and the world economy are changing in ways that generates polarization, marginalization, functional displacement, dispossession, and with them a growing predisposition to violence [...] There is a growing discrepancy between the declining industrial labor force and its absorption into an expanding service industry. Reemployment of the displaced worker becomes more and more difficult [...]. Such problems have [...] political consequences [...]. There have been marked increases in primordialism, racism, and discrimination" (Apter 1987, pp. 35-7).

⁷ See Appendix A for a comprehensive attitudinal profile of the constituencies of the French National Front and the Greater Romania Party, as well as a three-way comparison of these constituencies with the mainstream left and right constituencies in each country.

⁸ To date, the most comprehensive survey ever conducted in France ("Panel électoral français 2002"). There were three waves, from April to June 2002. The initial N (in April) was 4,107 respondents, with 1,822 respondents (out of a total N = 2,013) reinterviewed in May and 1,417 respondents who were interviewed in all three waves. The sample was representative for the total population of voters in France (more details and the main results are available at the CEVIPOF web site, www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr).

⁹ See Appendix A for detailed scores on various sub-dimensions and the afferent questions.

¹⁰ “Moderate left” includes those who voted for Hue, Jospin, Mamère and Taubira; “moderate right” the voters of Boutin, Chirac, Bayrou and Madelin; “extreme right” includes Le Pen and Mégret’s voters (Grunberg & Schweisguth 2003a, p. 349).

¹¹ Various labels such as “authoritarianism,” “anti-cosmopolitanism,” “anti-Europeanism,” “xenophobia” or “anti-democratic” each capture only a part of these attitudes.

¹² Le Pen’s share of the total vote in the first round of the 2002 election was 16.86 percent, 15.0 in 1995, and 14.4 in 1988, respectively (Data from the French Presidency web site, www.elysee.fr).

¹³ Ivarsflaten (2003) is using the term “centre-authoritarian” to express the same idea, that the “radical right” label does not match well the ideology of parties such as the French National Front.

¹⁴ Limited data availability (survey and exit poll data, as well as aggregate data for Romania, but only survey data for France and aggregate data for Ukraine) makes my analysis somewhat idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, both the available data and the literature on these cases support my assertions.


¹⁵ In order to keep the dimensions as similar as possible in the two cases I have selected questions from two Romanian surveys. I was unable to find in recent years a question similar to that on whether “there are too many immigrants in France”. The closest functional equivalent was a 1997 question on whether “ethnic minorities have too many rights”. I have also retained from the 1997 survey a question about views on privatization, which captures the respondent’s position on the economic or left-right dimension better than questions asked in subsequent surveys.

¹⁶ A composite index developed by the United Nations Development Program. HDI consists of three basic elements: longevity (life expectancy at birth), educational attainment (calculated as a weighted average of the adult literacy rate, with a weight of 2/3, and the enrollment ratio for all levels, with a weight of 1/3), and standard of living (measured through GDP per capita computed in US dollars on the basis of the purchasing power parity).

¹⁷ All three independent variables are highly correlated and they are also correlated with the dependent variable. To give one example, the coefficient for development in the first round of the 2000 presidential election is minus .72 for the full model. If region is not included as a control variable, the coefficient decreases to minus 1.2, and becomes minus 1.48 if both region and ethnicity are left out of the model. If we leave out the two control variables we overestimate the effect of development, because a large part of the variance in the dependent variable is in fact due to regional and ethnic effects.

¹⁸ I provide a list with descriptive statistics for all variables in Appendix B.

Figure 1. Economic and Political Attitudes of Core French Constituencies, 2002 Survey Data



Each dot represents the mapping of aggregate scores (percentages) for pro-capitalist attitudes (horizontal dimension) and a composite score of authoritarianism, xenophobia, political alienation and anti-EU attitudes among moderate left, moderate right and extreme right constituencies (see Appendix A for specific values).

Horizontal dimension (“economics”): composite score of questions about the respondent’s view on state intervention in the economy and whether he/she has a positive image about “privatization” and “profit”.

Vertical dimension (“politics”): mean score of four components:


- Authoritarianism*: score based on the respondent’s views on the death penalty, a more authoritarian justice and means to fight against juvenile delinquency;
- Xenophobia*: score based on the respondent’s views on immigration, race relations and whether the respondents thinks that some races are inherently better than others;
- Political alienation*: score based on the respondent’s answers to questions about the working of democracy in France, thinking that elected officials are corrupt and do not have an interest in the common people’s views
- Anti-EU*: score based on the respondent’s views on the EU, whether the respondents feels French rather than European, whether he/she would see the demise of the EU as a good thing

Constituencies:

- Left*: respondents who voted for Hue, Jospin, Mamère and Taubira;
- Right*: respondents who voted for Boutin, Chirac, Bayrou and Madelin;
- Extreme right*: respondents who voted for Le Pen and Mégret (Grunberg & Schweisguth 2003a: 349).
- France*: national (entire sample) mean scores

Source: mean scores computed by author using the results of data analyses performed by and reported in Grunberg & Schweisguth (2003a, p. 349; 2003b, p. 335). (Primary data source: CEVIPOF/CISDP/CECOP, “Panel electoral français 2002”)

Figure 2. Economic and Political Attitudes of Core Romanian Constituencies, 2002 Survey Data



Each dot represents the mapping of aggregate scores (percentages) for pro-capitalist attitudes (horizontal dimension) and a composite score of authoritarianism, xenophobia, political alienation and anti-EU attitudes among moderate left, moderate right and extreme right constituencies (see Appendix A for specific values).

Horizontal dimension (“economics”): scores represent the percentage of constituents favoring rapid privatization and a significant decrease of state intervention in the economy (Q1: 1997)

Vertical dimension (“politics”) - mean of four scores:

- Authoritarianism*: percent favoring the reintroduction of the death penalty (Q2: 2002);
- Xenophobia*: percent considering that “ethnic minorities have too many rights” (Q3: 1997);
- Political alienation*: 100 minus percent agreeing that “democracy is the best form of government” (Q4: 2002)
- Anti-EU*: 100 minus percent who would in favor of EU membership (Q5: 2002)

Constituencies:


- Left*: respondents who expressed intention to vote for the Social Democratic Party (the Party of Social Democracy in the case of the first and the third question)
- Right*: respondents who expressed intention to vote for either the Liberal Party or the Democratic Party (the Democratic Convention in the case of the first and the third question);
- Extreme right*: respondents who expressed intention to vote for the Greater Romania Party (either the GRP or the Party of National Unity in the case of the first and the third question).
- Romania*: sample mean

Source: means computed by author using the data sets of the 1997^a and 2002^b waves of the Soros Barometer of Public Opinion (www.sfos.ro);

^aQuestions 1 and 3

^bQuestions 2, 4 and 5

Figure 3. Education and Vote, First and Second Round of the 2000 Presidential Election in Romania



Candidates:

“Left”: Ion Iliescu (Party of Social Democracy/Social Democratic Party)

“Extreme right”: C.V. Tudor (Greater Romania Party)

“Right”: Theodor Stolojan (Liberal Party) and Mugur Isărescu (independent/Democratic Convention)

Source: graphs made by author using the data from the first and second-round IMAS exit polls (<http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/home.nsf/HomeEng;>)

**Table 1. Regional Development and Vote for Left:
Romanian Presidential Elections, 1996 and 2000**

	1996 first ¹	1996 runoff ²	2000 first ³	2000 runoff ⁴
Constant	101.7*** (15.9)	111.0*** (18.7)	101.6*** (13.9)	65.0*** (14.2)
H.D. Index ⁵	- 0.78** (0.21)	- 0.71** (0.24)	- 0.72*** (0.18)	0.04 (0.18)
Hungarians ⁶	- 0.23*** (0.06)	- 0.34*** (0.07)	- 0.25*** (0.05)	0.44*** (0.05)
Region ⁷	- 15.3*** (2.3)	- 15.2*** (2.7)	- 16.9*** (2.7)	- 15.1*** (2.1)
Adjusted R ²	0.83	0.82	0.88	0.68

N = 41 (number of counties/electoral districts in Romania).

p < .001
**
p < .01

Values in the table represent unstandardized coefficients of linear regression. Standard deviations in parentheses

¹Vote for the leftist candidate Ion Iliescu in the first round of the 1996 presidential election (percent)

²Vote for Iliescu in the 1996 presidential runoff (percent)

³Vote for Iliescu in the first round of the 2000 presidential election (percent)

⁴Vote for Iliescu in the 2000 presidential runoff (percent)

⁵Human development index of the county (1996 UNDP Report data)

⁶Percent ethnic Hungarians in the county (1991 Census data)

⁷Dummy variable, "1" if the county is located in Transylvania (16 cases), "0" otherwise

Table 2. Ethnicity, Region, Development and Vote in Ukraine, 1994-2002

	Left 2002 ¹	Kuchma 1994 ²	Kuchma 1999 ³	Right 2002 ⁴
Constant	16.1* (6.4)	55.3*** (12.2)	27.0** (7.2)	27.8* (10.6)
Russians ⁵	0.39*** (0.09)	0.91*** (0.18)	- 0.18 (0.11)	- 0.37* (0.16)
W Ukraine ⁶	- 12.2** (3.1)	- 35.3*** (5.8)	40.0*** (3.4)	34.1*** (5.1)
Urbanization ⁷	- 0.03 (0.11)	- 0.22 (0.21)	0.38** (0.12)	- 0.05 (0.18)
Adjusted R ²	0.76	0.84	0.86	0.82

N = 27 (number of oblasts/electoral districts in Ukraine).

p < .001
**
p < .01
*
p < .05

Values in the table represent unstandardized coefficients of linear regression. Standard deviations in parentheses

¹Party-list vote for the Ukrainian Communist Party, 2002 parliamentary election (percent)

²Vote for Leonid Kuchma in the 1994 presidential runoff (percent)

³Vote for Leonid Kuchma in the 1999 presidential runoff (percent)

⁴Party-list vote for the Ukrainian nationalist Viktor Yushenko Bloc, 2002 parliamentary election (percent)

⁵Percent ethnic Russians in the oblast' (1989 Census data)

⁶Dummy variable, "1" if the oblast' is located in Western Ukraine (seven cases), "0" otherwise

⁷Percent urban population in the oblast'

**Figure 4. Two Competitive Dimensions and Three Candidates:
Presidential Elections in Ukraine, 1994 and 1999**



Two-dimensional mapping of policy positions of the three candidates competing in the 1994 and 1999 presidential runoffs in Ukraine: Kravchuk (left-nationalist, 1994), Kuchma (centrist, 1994 and 1999), and Simonenko (Communist Russophile, 1999)

Horizontal dimension (“economics” or left-right): attitudes toward economic reforms and capitalism

Vertical dimension (“nationalism” or attitudes toward state building and language policies): favoring a stronger Ukrainian state, pro-Western attitudes and a single official language, Ukrainian (upper position on the vertical dimension) versus favoring stronger ties with Russia and equal legal status for Russian and Ukrainian languages (bottom position on the vertical dimension)

Note: mapping/ordering of candidates on each dimension based on Birch 2000, 68-9; Miller and Klobucar 2000, pp. 678-84; Kuzio 1997, pp. 42-3; and D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio 1999, p. 59.

**Appendix A. Ideological Specificity of Extreme Right Electorates in
France and Romania, 2002 Survey Data (percentages)**

	National	Left	Right	Extreme right
<i>Economics</i>				
Pro-market (France)	52	33	76	51
Favors rapid privatization (Romania ¹⁹⁹⁷)	52	39	68	48
<i>Authoritarianism, xenophobia, anti-Europeanism, political alienation</i>				
France:				
Authoritarianism (“punitiveness”)	47	25	48	82
Xenophobia	58	30	56	98
Political alienation	44	25	37	64
Anti-European	44	23	33	79
Romania:				
Favors death penalty	45	43	45	57
“Ethnic minorities have too many rights” ¹⁹⁹⁷	26	28	22	54
Democracy <i>not</i> the best form of government	28	21	11	37
Would <i>not</i> vote in favor of joining the EU	24	16	15	26
<i>Social conservatism</i>				
France:				
Traditional values	42	42	71	73
Anti-homosexuals	32	32	59	68
Romania:				
Traditional values	78	86	70	85
Anti-homosexuals	59	68	53	66

¹⁹⁹⁷Question asked in the 1997 survey

Sources:

France: Grunberg & Schweisguth (2003a, p. 349; 2003b, p. 335).

(Primary data source: CEVIPOF/CISDP/CECOP, “Panel electoral français 2002”, www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr)

Romania: the 1997 and 2002 waves of the Soros Barometer of Public Opinion

(Data sets available at www.sfos.ro);

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 1

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>
Left 1996, first round presidential election	33.2	13.3
Left 1996, presidential runoff	46.6	15.2
Left 2000, first round presidential election	36.6	14.0
Left 2000, presidential runoff	66.2	8.6
Human development index (1996)	77.9	4.5
Percent ethnic Hungarians	9.3	19.5

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 2

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>
Left 2002 (Communist party list vote)	18.5	11.8
Kuchma 1994 runoff	49.2	26.9
Kuchma 1999 runoff	57.5	17.3
Right 2002 (Viktor Yushenko Bloc party list vote)	26.3	21.8
Percent ethnic Russians	19.0	18.4
Percent urban population	63.1	16.8

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