

Does Education Make Voters More Leftist or More Rightist?
A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis

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Summary

Education is one of the most important determinants of political preferences and voting behavior. However, the direction of this impact is not universal. In a less developed, post-Communist polity like Romania, education is negatively correlated with support for the left. In a post-industrial democracy like France, increased education translates into more support for the moderate left (i.e., the “post-materialist” left, Socialists and Ecologists). We explain these differences as the joint effect of recent historical experiences and the current level of economic, social and political development of the two polities.

Fifty years ago, Lipset (1960: 230) observed that a general phenomenon of democratic politics was that parties were "primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes", with the right as the party of the haves and the left as the party of have-nots. Is this phenomenon equally true today? Do elections continue to be "a democratic translation of the class struggle"? If the answer is yes, is it equally applicable to post-industrial countries with well-established credentials, and emerging democracies, such as those from the post-Communist region? Or does the answer have to be nuanced from one region to another? Last, but not least, did the meaning of class itself change in any way in recent years?

Scholars have shown that economic and social changes in post-industrial nations are reflected in their politics, with the "new politics" of postmaterial concerns increasingly competing with the "old politics" of class and purely material interests (Kitschelt 1994; Inglehart 1997). The left side of the political spectrum in these polities is now dominated by a cosmopolitan and libertarian "new left." On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, the effect of lesser development in conjunction with political and institutional legacies is that, for the time being, political life is dominated by a rather conservative, authoritarian and nationalist "old left."

There are two ways in which we believe our research adds to the abovementioned findings. The vast majority of studies so far are cross-sectional; therefore, they cannot give a direct measure of the magnitude of change. Moreover, there are few cross-regional comparisons that look at both post-industrial democracies and lesser developed, emerging democracies. Our study does just that. We focus on the

demand side, and we analyze the changes in the sociological and ideological profile of the electorate of mainstream left in a post-industrial democracy (France), and a post-communist democracy (Romania) during the last two decades.

Post-industrialism, post-Communism, and support for left: West vs. East

Until 1960s, democratic politics was dominated almost exclusively by class conflicts, so "all political questions [were reducible] to their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in the economy should there be?" (Downs 1957: 116). Socialist and social-democratic parties were, at that time, more radical in terms of economic policies they endorsed, which made them less palatable for middle-class voters' taste. Things started to change in the following decades. Mainstream left parties became more moderate, and "conservative socialism" became the dominant ideology of major parties in Western democracies (Lipset 1964: 362; Lijphart 1984: 31-33).

We believe that the most telling indicator of this ideological drift is the extent of change experienced by left-wing parties – whether, and to what extent, the constituents and ideology of these parties have indeed become "new left"; thus, we study changes in the profile of left constituencies in Eastern and Western Europe. Bell described a fundamental shift in the relation between class and power, with political position and technical skill becoming more important than wealth and property. According to Bell, the engine driving these structural changes is education, which "has become the major way to acquire the technical skills necessary for the administrative and power-wielding jobs in society" (1964: 21). This makes a Weberian conceptualization of class, related to life chances, a more useful analytical device than its alternative, the narrower

Marxian definition of class as merely a function of the relation to the means of production. Therefore, we decided to focus on education rather than class as a measure of socioeconomic status.

Education is not just a proxy for class, with better educated people having better incomes and jobs than people with less education. On the one hand, increased *economic* affluence in post-industrial democracies has worked primarily to the advantage of the right, since people who are better off tend to oppose redistribution. Yet on the other hand, another effect of increased affluence is that younger generations are better educated than the old ones. Better education makes people more tolerant and cosmopolitan, and this has benefited the moderate left (Inglehart 1997: 237-66). This process is paralleled by a process of change of the meaning of Left and Right itself in political discourse (Dalton 2006: 121), with New Politics issues gaining increased salience. In recent years, the major cleavage in Western democracies is pitting a conservative right against a libertarian left (Kitschelt 1994; 1995).

In Eastern Europe, the main axis of party competition in Eastern Europe is orthogonal to that from Western Europe (Kitschelt 1992; Marks et al. 2006). Survey data indicates that, while in the West the natural constituency of the New Left, post-materialists voters, are not too concerned about the extent of government ownership of industry, Eastern European post-materialists "are far more favorable than other groups to moving away from state ownership of business and industry" (Inglehart 1997: 262), and thus will be more inclined to support a libertarian right, rather than a libertarian left – though the latter is typically missing in Eastern Europe anyway:

Figure 1

If we focus on within-region differences in the types of left we find in Eastern Europe, we believe that an important root cause of these differences was O'Donnell and Schmitter's balance of power between hardliners and softliners (1986: Ch. 3) prior to the transition to democracy. In places where softliners had the upper hand, as it happened in Poland or Hungary, economic and even political reforms started before 1989; after the transition, the natural step for the former governing parties was to transform into genuine social-democratic parties, with an ideology and social base that resembles their Western counterparts. Where the government before the transition was dominated by hardliners, as it happened in Romania or Bulgaria, there were no reforms before 1989, and the successor parties are still struggling with the legacy of the past (Fish 1998).

Consequently, we develop a typology of dominant left-wing parties in the East and West, based on their ideology and constituents. On the one hand, we have Old Left parties such as the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD), which is still largely unreformed, paternalistic, conservative and authoritarian, a reflection of politics in a relatively underdeveloped post-Communist country, with a harsh regime before 1989. Romania is still less reformed than Poland, largely because the country was governed mostly by the Social Democrats, who were, and continue to be, rather lukewarm towards reforms. On the other hand, we have New Left parties such as the French Socialists and (especially) Greens, representative of the electoral alignments characteristic for an advanced post-industrial nation. Then we have more ambiguous

cases, like the Polish Socialists or the American Democrats. In the first case, the party and the Polish society itself have moved further toward modernization and reforms than their Romanian counterparts; at the same time, the country's level of socioeconomic development, together with its relatively high conservatism, may explain why Polish Socialists do not look yet like a full-fledged New Left party – at least in terms of their constituency. The American society is also more conservative than other post-industrial nations (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 65), and this explains why the Democrats are in an intermediate position between an Old Left and a New Left position:

Figure 2

Figure 2 confirms the above considerations. In Romania, electoral support for PSD in the 2000 parliamentary election drops from a 55 percent high among voters with elementary education or less to a 26 percent low among voters with higher education. In France we see the opposite pattern of support, with the vote for Jospin and Mamère in 2002 being about ten percentage points larger among voters with a higher education degree than among voters with elementary education.

Moving from "Old Politics" to "New Politics" (or not)

What follows is a longitudinal analysis of data from several surveys of French and Romanian voters. This analysis will show that, while the profile of the electorate of the moderate left in France has changed significantly, shifting from an "old left" electorate in the late 1980s to a "new left" electorate, there was little change in the profile of the

constituents of Romania's left which continues to be, as it was at the beginning of competitive elections in the early 1990s, an "old left" electorate.

France: from "old politics" to "new politics"

If we first look at France, we see that in a 1988 survey, the less educated voters positioned themselves to the left of better educated voters – a pattern consistent with an "old politics" type of electoral alignment:

Figure 3

The one partial exception to this general pattern, an exception for which we do not have a good explanation at this point, is that the most right-wing voters were not those with higher education, but those with a high school (baccalaureate) degree. Be that as it may, by 2002 the general pattern is reversed: the better educated voters position themselves in a more left-wing position than less educated voters, suggesting a shift from "old politics" to "new politics."

This shift was further reflected in partisan preferences. In Figure 4, we show the ratios of partisan support for left in France as a function of education in 1988 and 2002, expressed as ratios (percent of vote for left within the group divided by the percent of vote for left in the whole electorate). A ratio larger than one indicates that the group is overrepresented in the electorate of the left, and a ratio smaller than one indicates that the group is underrepresented:

Figure 4

We see a similar evolution as in Figure 3: in the late 1980s, the French moderate left had a predominantly "old politics" electorate, in which voters with little education were overrepresented. Currently, it has a "new politics" electorate, and well educated voters are now overrepresented.

Finally, we may ask ourselves to what extent the ideology of this electorate is indeed a "new left" ideology. To this end, we used factor analysis of the 2002 survey data in order to obtain a two-dimensional mapping of the main partisan constituencies in France:

Figure 5

What we see in Figure 5 (without any need for rotating the solutions) are two clearly identifiable factors: an Old Politics factor, related to economic policies (profit, privatization), and a New Politics factor, related to xenophobia ("there are too many immigrants," "some races are better than others"), authoritarianism (the death penalty) and moral conservatism (homosexuality). If the greatest distance along the first dimension is that between Communist voters on the left and liberal voters on the right, the second dimension separates especially the two typical New Politics constituencies, Greens and voters of the National Front. If we look at the average policy position of voters grouped by education, our expectations are confirmed. Better educated voters are indeed more rightist on economic policies compared to less educated voters, though only marginally so. But the distance between these groups is much larger along the second dimension, where voters with higher education are in the same position as Green

voters, and voters with elementary education are located close to the average position of extreme right-wing voters.

Romanian left: trapped in “old politics”

For almost twenty years, since the very beginning of competitive elections in post-Communist Romania, the Social Democratic Party had a monopoly over the left side of the political landscape in Romania (albeit it presented itself under various names).

Whether by deliberate choice or because of structural constraints (we believe it is a mix of both), the party started in an Old Left position in 1990 and has remained there ever since. One telling proof is the speech delivered on December 13, 2004 by the former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party to the presidency of Romania, in which he acknowledged his defeat. According to Năstase, the profile of his constituency was primarily rural, old, and poor, a constituency in need of more than just help for development – it was a constituency in need for help to survive.¹

Figure 6

Figure 6 illustrates the substantial impact of regional development on electoral support for the candidate of the left in the first round of that particular election. In the more developed counties, where about three out of every four inhabitants has access to

¹ “Rezultatul votului [...] arată că, în prezent, există două Români. În primul rând, este vorba de o Românie urbană în creștere, cu o solidă componentă liberală, [...] care așteaptă de la stat mai degrabă șanse decât sprijin; aceasta este România care l-a votat pe Traian Băsescu. Dar mai există și o Românie rurală, cu oameni în vârstă și oameni săraci, care are încă nevoie de ajutor nu doar pentru dezvoltare, ci și pentru supraviețuire; acești oameni au avut încredere în mine.” (Adrian Năstase, “Vom sprijini proiectele lui Traian Băsescu,” *Revista 22*, Vol. 14, No. 771, December 16-23, 2004).

piped water, Năstase captured only about one-third of the total vote. In the less developed counties, where the vast majority of the population *does not* have access to piped water, Năstase won a majority, approaching 60 percent of the total vote in the poorest counties. Then it should come as no surprise that Romanian have-nots would continue to identify with, and vote for, the left.

Figure 7

The data in Figure 7 confirms that this is indeed the case. Less educated voters continue to place themselves in a more left-wing position than the average Romanian voter, as they did in the early 1990s. As a matter of fact, the distance between the left-right self-positioning of voters with little education on the left and that of voters with higher education on the right has *increased* in the last fifteen years. This continuity is further reflected in voting patterns. The strong and negative correlation between education and support for left is as visible today as it was in the early 1990s. The voters with little education continue to be overrepresented in the electorate of the Romanian SDP, while the voters with good education continue to be underrepresented (Figure 8):

Figure 8

How well are these patterns of electoral support matched by the policy positions of various constituencies? To answer this question, as in the case of France, we use factor analysis of survey data to map Romania's most important partisan constituencies,

as well as social and demographic subgroups (as a function of education, age, and residence, urban or rural):

Figure 9

What we see in Figure 9 is that there are important similarities, but also equally important differences, between Romania and France. It is immediately apparent that the main line of cleavage in Romania is indeed orthogonal to France's main alignment, with the moderate right-wing constituency being more libertarian than the constituents of the Social Democratic Party. Another important difference is that the first dimension, related to economic policies, appears more important than the second, the opposite of what we saw in France, another indication that, unlike in France, Romania's political life continues to be dominated by Old Politics conflicts (we compared the eigenvalues of the two dimensions in each case as proxies for the relative salience of the two dimensions). Last, but not least, there are important differences along both dimensions between the policy positions endorsed by voters with little education and those of voters with good education. Overall, the data confirms the Old Politics image of the Romanians Social Democrats, a party based primarily on older, rural, poor voters with little education.

Conclusion

Our main goal in this paper was to analyze two cases, one from Western Europe (France), the other one from Eastern Europe (Romania), and test the "New Politics" vs. "Old Politics" theory, according to which the electoral alignments in the two regions are

different: a libertarian left versus a conservative right in the West, a conservative left against a libertarian right in the East. A closely related point would be the expectation that better educated voters, i.e., the most libertarian and cosmopolitan segment of the electorate, would tend to favor the left in the West and the right in the East.


Our longitudinal analysis of survey data confirmed these expectations. In France, the ideological landscape is unambiguously two-dimensional, and the second dimension separates most clearly Green voters from extreme right voters, as the “New Politics” theory would predict. We saw how, in the last decades, the better educated voters have become more leftist, in terms of both their self-placement on the left-right continuum, as well voting. This is in spite of the fact that, if we look at the first dimension, voters with higher education are actually more right-wing than voters with less education. However, this appears to be more than compensated by the former group’s policy preferences on the second, “New Politics” dimension, which makes them the natural constituency for the left. France appears as a typical case of a post-industrial nation, with a libertarian left that has a middle-class, well educated constituency.

In Romania, things are very different. It is still a rather underdeveloped society, not only in comparison with Western post-industrial nations like France, but even when compared to other post-Communist countries from Eastern Europe. According to a recent National Human Development Report, the entire population of Bulgaria was using adequate sanitation facilities and improved water sources. In Romania, it was barely more than a half of its population – 53 percent had adequate sanitation facilities, 58 percent were using improved water sources (UNDP 2003: 14). This is in a country

where 45 percent of the population continue to live in villages (UNDP 2003: 100), and urban-rural disparities are comparable to those found in many Third World countries. In one analysis of social underdevelopment in the Third World, Handelman noticed the gap between urban centers, where "at the close of past century, 72 percent of the population had access to proper home sanitation – and rural areas, where that figure fell to 20 percent (2006: 8). That means a 52 percent gap between urban and rural. Although we do not have disaggregated figures for Romania, we believe a good proxy is the proportion of the population without access to running water. The numbers were 12.3 percent for urban and 84.3 percent for rural – a 72 percent gap (UNDP 2003: 108).


Clearly, such major structural problems have political consequences, and although the Romanian Social Democratic Party is a member of the Socialist International, whether its policies resemble those of the French Socialists, or even those of the Hungarian or the Polish Socialists, is debatable. The electorate of the PSD is different from the electorate of those parties; SDP's core constituency resemble more the constituents of the Russian Communist Party, whose support "decreases with urbanization, educational level, and family income and increases with the voter's age" (Colton 2000: 78). We believe that, in the long run, Romania's accession to the EU has the potential to change the economic and social conditions in the country in such a way as to make them more conducive to a shift of on the left from an "Old Politics" position to a "New Politics" position. Whether that would actually happen or not, and if it does, whether it will happen because of the PSD, or in spite of it, remains to be seen.

Figure 1. Linkages between libertarian/authoritarian and market/nonmarket dimensions in Eastern and Western Europe



Sources: Figure 1 in Kitschelt 1992: 17; Figure 1.3 in Kitschelt 1994: 32, and Figure 1.1 in Kitschelt 1995: 15.

Figure 2. Education and vote for left in four countries




Romania: Vote for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in the November 2000 Senate election;
 Poland: Vote for the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) – Labor Union (UP) coalition in the September 2001 election for the Sejm;
 US: Vote for the Democratic candidate John Kerry in the November 2004 presidential election;
 France: Vote for the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin and the Green candidate Noël Mamère in the April 2002 presidential election.

Sources:

Romania: IMAS 2000 parliamentary election exit poll data, <<http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/home.nsf/HomeEng>>, Accessed January 15, 2000.
 Poland: Aleks Szczerbiak, 2003. “Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties’ Electoral Strategies and Bases of Support.” *Europe Asia-Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 729-746 (Table 2, p. 746).
 US: Larry Sabato, 2006. “The Election That Broke The Rules.” In Larry Sabato (ed.) *Divided States of America: The slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election*. New York: Pearson Longman (Table 3, p. 108).
 France: CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file]. Paris: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques – CIDSP.

**Figure 3. Education and left-right self-positioning of voters:
France, 1988 & 2002**



Source: results computed by authors using the following data sets:

Pierce, Roy. 1988. “French Presidential Election Survey” [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Roy Pierce, University of Michigan [producer], 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1996.

CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file]. Paris: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques – CIDSP.

Coding:

“Elementary education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with elementary education or less (“sans diplôme” or “Certificat d’Études Primaires”)


“Vocational”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with vocational training (“Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C,” “Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (CAP),” “Brevet d’enseignement professionnel (BEP),” or “BAC d’enseignement technique ou professionnel”)

“High school”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a “general” baccalaureate degree or some college (“BAC d’enseignement general”, “BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans”)

“Higher education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a university degree (“Diplôme de l’enseignement supérieur (2ème ou 3ème cycles, grande école”)

“Electorate” – mean left-right self-positioning of all respondents.

Figure 4. Education and support for left in France, 1988 and 2002 (ratios)



Note: the ratio is computed by dividing the support for left within a certain educational group by the support for left in the population as a whole. A ratio larger than 1.0 indicates a higher level of support within that group compared to the population as a whole, and a ratio lower than 1.0 indicates a lower level of support.

For example, the first column on the left corresponds to a ratio of 1.12, obtained by dividing 56.8 percent (the total vote intention for moderate left candidates in the first round of the 1988 French presidential election) by 52.5 percent (the vote intention for the same candidates in the whole French electorate).

The data refers to the moderate left candidates in the 1988 and 2002 elections. We followed the typical approach of French scholars, who distinguish between extreme left (Workers' Struggle, Revolutionary Communist League, Workers' Party) and moderate left (Communists, Socialists, Greens, Radicals), and we only looked at the latter.

In 1988, this included François Mitterrand (Socialist), André Lajoinie (Communist), Antoine Waechter (Green), and Pierre Juquin (Communist splinter).


In 2002, the moderate left candidates included Lionel Jospin (Socialist), Jean-Pierre Chevènement (Citizens' Movement), Noël Mamère (Green), Robert Hue (Communist), and Christiane Taubira (Left Radicals).

For the division between extreme left and moderate left, see, for example, Dolez and 2003 (Table 1, p. 255).

Source: ratios computed by authors using the following data sets:

Pierce, Roy. 1988. "French Presidential Election Survey" [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Roy Pierce, University of Michigan [producer], 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1996.
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. "Panel électoral français 2002" [Computer file]. Paris: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques – CIDSP.

Figure 5. Two-dimensional policy mapping of partisan constituencies in France (2002)
Factor analysis of survey data (unrotated solutions)



Source: data analysis performed by authors using the following dataset:
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. "Panel électoral français 2002" [Computer file]. Paris:
Banque de Données Socio-Politiques – CIDSP.

We obtained the factors using the principal components method in SPSS 10.0.

Questions:

- “Political interest” – Q 3, “Est-ce que vous vous intéressez à la politique ?”
- “Too many immigrants in France” – Q 39.2, “Il y a trop d'immigrés en France”
- “Homosexuality not ok” – Q 39.4, “L'homosexualité est une manière acceptable de vivre sa sexualité”
- “Reintroduce the death penalty” – Q 39.5, “Il faudrait rétablir la peine de mort”
- “Some races better” – Q 39.7, “Il y a des races moins douées que d'autres”
- “Abandon EU” – Q 57, “Si l'on annonçait demain que l'Union européenne est abandonnée, éprouveriez vous de grands regrets, ou un vif soulagement?”
- “Profit” and “privatization” – Attitudes toward profit (Q 59.7) and privatization (Q 59.8):
“Pouvez-vous me dire, pour chacun de ces mots, s'il évoque pour vous quelque chose de très positif, d'assez positif, d'assez négatif ou de très négatif ?”
- “Democracy works” – Q 6, “Diriez-vous qu'en France la démocratie fonctionne très bien, assez bien, pas très bien ou pas bien du tout?”

We saved the scores for each of the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for each constituency or social group mapped in the graph:

Constituencies: mean scores for the voters of each major presidential candidate

Groups:

“18-29”, “30-45”, “46-59”, “60+”: mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over 60, respectively


“Elementary education”: mean scores for respondents with elementary education or less (“sans diplôme” or “Certificat d'Études Primaires”; score 1 or 2 for Q 111B, “Quel est le diplôme le plus élevé que vous ayez obtenu?”)

“Vocational”: mean scores for respondents with vocational training (“Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C,” “Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle (CAP),” “Brevet d'enseignement professionnel (BEP),” or “BAC d'enseignement technique ou professionnel” – scores 3, 4, 5, and 6 for Q111B)

“High school”: mean scores for respondents with a “general” baccalaureate degree or some college (“BAC d'enseignement general”, “BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans” – scores 7 or 8 for Q111B)

“Higher education”: mean score for respondents with a university degree (“Diplôme de l'enseignement supérieur (2ème ou 3ème cycles, grande école)” – score 9 for Q111B)

Figure 6. Underdevelopment and regional support for left in Romania, first round of the 2004 presidential election



Source: computed by authors.


Each data point represents one of Romania’s 41 electoral districts (județe/counties). The horizontal axis represents the percentage of the population in the county having running water in the household; the vertical axis represents the vote (percent) for the left-wing candidate Adrian Năstase (PSD) in the first round of the 2004 presidential election.

Data from

Biroul Electoral Central (Central Electoral Commission). 2004. “Președinte – Voturi Valabil exprimate pe circumscripții electorale.” <<http://www.bec2004.ro/rezultate.htm>> Accessed March 26, 2008.

United Nations Development Programme Romania. 2003. *A Decade Later: Understanding the Transition Process in Romania. National Human Development Report Romania 2001-2002*. Bucharest: UNDP (Table 4, p. 131).

Figure 7. Education and mean left-right self-positioning of voters: Romania, 1993 and 2006



Source: computed by authors using the following datasets:

- ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calității Vieții/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life). 2002. “Valori fundamentale europene - 1993” (European Values, 1993) [computer file]. Bucharest: RODA (Arhiva Română de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive).
- Fundatia Soros România (Soros Foundation Romania). 2007. “Barometrul de Opinie Publică mai 2006” (Public Opinion Barometer, May 2006 wave) [computer file]. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania.

“Elementary education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with elementary education or less (no more than eight years of schooling)


“Vocational”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with vocational training or incomplete high school

“High school”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a high school degree (baccalaureate) or some college

“Higher education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a university degree

“Electorate” – mean left-right self-positioning of all respondents

Figure 8. Education and ratio of support for left, Romania 1992 & 2006



Source: computed by authors using the following datasets:

ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calitatii Vietii/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life). 2002. “Valori fundamentale europene - 1993” (European Values, 1993) [computer file]. Bucharest: RODA (Arhiva Română de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive).
 Fundatia Soros România (Soros Foundation Romania). 2007. “Barometrul de Opinie Publică mai 2006” (Public Opinion Barometer, May 2006 wave) [computer file]. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania.

The ratio was computed by dividing the support for left within a certain educational group by the support for left in the population as a whole. A ratio larger than 1.0 indicates a higher level of support within that group compared to the population as a whole, and a ratio lower than 1.0 indicates a lower level of support.

In the 1993 survey, respondents what party did they voted for in the 1993 parliamentary election. Left-wing voters were considered respondents who indicated the Democratic National Salvation Front (FSDN), which later became Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) and then Social Democratic Party (PSD)

In 2006, left-wing voters were considered respondents who indicated a vote intention for the PSD (“if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, what party would you vote for?”)

“Elementary education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with elementary education or less (no more than eight years of schooling)


“Vocational”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with vocational training or incomplete high school

“High school”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a high school degree (baccalaureate) or some college

“Higher education”: mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a university degree

“Electorate” – mean left-right self-positioning of all respondents

Figure 9. Two-dimensional policy mapping of partisan constituencies in Romania (2006)
Factor analysis of survey data (rotated solutions)



Source: data analysis performed by authors using the following dataset:

Fundatia Soros România (Soros Foundation Romania). 2007. "Barometrul de Opinie Publică mai 2006" (Public Opinion Barometer, May 2006 wave) [computer file]. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania.

We obtained the factors using the principal components method in SPSS 10.0. The factors were rotated using Varimax rotation

Questions:

"Democracy": whether the respondent thinks Romania is better off with more than one political party

"Communism": respondent's evaluation of Communism (whether it was good or bad)

"Homosexuality": whether the respondent believes that homosexuality should be illegal

"Religion": should religion be compulsory in schools?

"Strong leader": Romania needs a strong leader, who would end the current chaos

"Order": respondents had to choose between order and freedom

"Nationalism": how proud is the respondent for being Romanian

"Freedom": respondents had to choose between equality and freedom

"Inequality": whether income inequality in Romania is too high or too low

"State intervention": whether state intervention in the economy should be increased or decreased

We saved the scores for each of the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for each constituency or social group mapped in the graph:

Constituencies: mean scores for the voters of each major political party

Groups:

"18-29", "30-45", "46-59", "60+": mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over 60, respectively

"Urban" and "rural": mean scores for urban and rural voters, respectively

"Elementary education": mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with elementary education or less (no more than eight years of schooling)

"Vocational": mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with vocational training or incomplete high school

"High school": mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a high school degree (baccalaureate) or some college

"Higher education": mean left-right self-positioning of respondents with a university degree

"Electorate" – mean left-right self-positioning of all respondents

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