

# Historical Legacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behaviour

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OVER THE LAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN a spirited debate among comparativists as to whether the post-communist transition reflects the earlier transition process in Latin America and Southern Europe or whether it is unique.<sup>1</sup> While the literature is far-ranging and diverse, the central debate is whether the past influences the transition process to such an extent that key comparative concepts such as democratisation or modernisation lose their utility.<sup>2</sup> Transitologists realise that the historical experiences of post-communist countries are distinct from those of Latin American and Southern European countries. However, they question whether these experiences are determinant of behaviour and, especially, of institutions. For example, Przeworski argues that all democratising countries 'are determined by a common destination, not by different points of departure'.<sup>3</sup>

This debate is important because it not only highlights key differences in the interpretation of the institutional choice of regimes but also provides a contrast over the determinants of political behaviour.<sup>4</sup> For transitologists, general factors such as the mode of transition, institutional design and elite bargaining allow the comparison of the post-communist transitions within a broader framework. Those who embrace a legacies perspective argue that the stark differences in behaviour and institutions throughout Eastern Europe demonstrate the limitations of inter-regional as well as intra-regional comparisons.<sup>5</sup>

An issue that has figured prominently in this debate is post-communist voting behaviour. One of the implicit assumptions of much of this literature is that socio-economic (development) variables can largely account for post-communist voter choice. More specifically, the economic voting which is so prevalent among electorates in developed countries is also found to be a feature of post-communist electorates. For example, in their analysis of Polish voting Heyns & Bialecki find that socio-economic factors largely accounted for the early support of Solidarity.<sup>6</sup> In seeking to understand the rise of former communist parties, Pacek argues that post-communist electorates engaged in retrospective voting, which punished the incumbent reformers.<sup>7</sup>

Others, however, argue that voting behaviour and social cleavages cannot be fully understood by simply looking at the economic basis of voting. Harper finds that no model of economic voting (whether retrospective, sociotropic or prospective) can account for voter choice in Lithuania, Hungary or Bulgaria.<sup>8</sup> Although Harper

provides no alternative explanation for voter choice, Powers & Cox find that the Polish electorate's interpretation of the past is more determinant of voter choice than is personal economic situation.<sup>9</sup> However, this study examined the *Polish* interpretation of the past. To this point, no research has been conducted to examine whether the influence of a historical legacy is truly comparative and cross-national.

This article seeks to make a contribution to this debate by exploring the structural determinants of social cleavages in Romania and Ukraine. These countries were chosen in order to compare whether the pre-World War I and communist legacies have a comparable influence on voting behaviour. We analyse the effect of several independent variables on voting behaviour, including the historical legacy, ethnicity and socio-economic indicators. Unlike previous research, we find that socio-economic variables are only slightly influential in explaining voting patterns. Instead, we find that the historical legacy variable is much more significant in determining social cleavages and voting behaviour. Unlike earlier research which found that socio-economic variables were positively correlated with reform policies and politicians, we find that variables such as urbanisation and education are not necessarily positively correlated with reform support in the post-communist context. Therefore, we find strong evidence that history and culture do matter in determining how the electorate perceives choices.

#### *Pre-communist and communist historical legacies reconsidered*

Many studies have found a link between pre-communist historical legacies and institutional choice. Ishiyama argues that in certain East European countries (most notably the Czech Republic) the initial selection of the electoral system was influenced by the type of interwar electoral system.<sup>10</sup> Kitschelt argues that pre-communist experiences had an influence on the communist regime which ultimately has an impact on party cleavages.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, he argues that pre-communist 'experiences can be distinguished rather easily, but the length of the political liberalisation phase in the 1980s and the significance of having had two or three rounds of free elections since 1990 may be disputable'.<sup>12</sup> Kitschelt argues that it is much easier to isolate the content and influence of pre-communist legacies than the communist legacy. While we do not believe that isolating these pre-communist legacies is necessarily an easier task, we do believe that pre-communist legacies must be included in any analysis of post-communist social cleavages.

Our claim that history matters is not new in the case of either Ukraine or Romania nor is the claim that their distinctive historical legacies make politics in Western Ukraine (especially in Galicia<sup>13</sup>) and Transylvania<sup>14</sup> different from the rest of these two countries. Various studies have examined differences in regional voting in Ukraine but much less has been written about Romanian regional voting patterns.<sup>15</sup> While these regions share a common historical legacy, we know of no study that has compared the impact of this legacy on voting behaviour.<sup>16</sup> Therefore in this section we will outline the Transylvanian and Galician historical legacies. In the next section we use electoral data to offer a measure of the impact of the legacy on voting behaviour. As a point of departure from most studies that stress the differences among post-communist countries, we argue that the cleavage structure similarities that exist

in regions of Romania and Ukraine can be explained by the same historical legacy. Therefore, unlike these previous studies, we argue that a historical legacy can have an influence in more than one country and that this influence need not be uniform throughout the country.

Chronicling the Hapsburg history and its historical legacy is complex because of the length of the monarchy (almost 500 years). The Hapsburg Empire was consolidated in the sixteenth century and the Hapsburg monarchy ruled Central Europe until 1918. The 1867 Compromise established the dual monarchy, and although Transylvania and Galicia were regions of the Austro–Hungarian Empire, they were provinces in different Austro–Hungarian states (Galicia was part of Cisleithania while Transylvania was included in Transleithania).

Even before the 1867 Compromise Transylvania had a special legal status within the Empire in which the nobility (including ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians) were allowed to construct the legal systems and the local government structures.<sup>17</sup> Ethnic Romanian serfdom was eliminated and, as Kideckel notes, ‘class differences were moderated ... by cooperative community social relations and practices, themselves crafted from institutions inherited from the feudal past’.<sup>18</sup> While ethnic Romanians faced some measure of discrimination by the Hungarian nobility, reform rather than revolution was the goal of ethnic Romanians. Fischer-Galati argues that while ethnic Romanians in Wallachia and Moldavia<sup>19</sup> demanded independence from the Ottoman Porte, ethnic Romanians in Transylvania only wanted to reform ‘the imperial framework’.<sup>20</sup> In the case of Galicia the Polish nobility ‘espoused a non-exclusivist “aristocratic nationalism” and co-opted the nobility of the other ethnic communities’.<sup>21</sup> Like Transylvania, Galicia also enjoyed an autonomous status and Western Ukrainians were much freer than Eastern Ukrainians in developing ‘their own national culture and political life’.<sup>22</sup> The greater level of ethnic tolerance was necessary in Transylvania and Galicia because these regions had a large number of ethnic minorities. In Galicia there was a significant Polish community (indeed, Polish was the official language) while in Transylvania there were significant ethnic Hungarian and German communities.

The religion of these regions was also different. Not only were the ethnic minorities Catholics and Protestants, but also a sizable majority of ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia and ethnic Romanians were members of the Greek Catholic Church, which was an especially powerful force in Transylvania.<sup>23</sup> For example, Gallagher describes Romania as a country

bisected by the faultline separating Christian Europe’s Latin West and Orthodox East ... The mainly Orthodox provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which formed the original Romanian state between 1866 and 1918, are typically thought to belong to the Balkans, while on the other side of the Carpathian mountains the province of Transylvania, part of Romania since 1918, is seen as Central European, mainly because of its experience with Habsburg rule and its large Western Christian minorities.<sup>24</sup>

In inter-war Transylvania the large ethnic Hungarian and German minorities constituted approximately 40% of the population, and all of the minorities were either Catholic or Protestant. If we add to this figure the number of Romanians that belonged

to the Greek Catholic Church, then approximately 70% of Transylvania's population belonged to a Western Christian denomination prior to the communist takeover.

These figures are important because, as Kitschelt argues, these pre-communist legacies influenced the communist reform process.<sup>25</sup> In the case of Transylvania and Galicia these cultural and religious differences had a marked impact on the regions during the communist period. Galicia was, from the very beginning of its incorporation in the Soviet Union in 1939, Ukraine's most anti-Russian province. Part of the Galician mythology involved the military struggles that Ukrainian nationalists fought in this region against Soviet troops up to 1955. These myths, though, are not easy to disseminate to the rest of the country, because this resistance was 'confined to Western Ukraine, and because the population of Greater Ukraine have been long accustomed to an interpretation of the Second World War which glorified traditional Soviet myths and symbols'.<sup>26</sup>

The region's distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* the rest of Ukraine continued during subsequent years and became more apparent in the late 1980s when the Galician region became the leader in what was initially a movement for support of *perestroika* and *glasnost* and later turned into a movement for full independence. In his account of the pro-democratisation movements in Ukraine during 1990, Prizel points out how these protests 'illustrated the phenomenal growth of the Ukrainian national movement, as well as its limits'.<sup>27</sup> They may have been impressive, but they nevertheless remained largely confined to the western part of the country. Not surprisingly, after Ukraine became independent, support for democratic and reformist parties had an important regional dimension, being much stronger in Galicia than in the rest of the country. Birch stresses the impact of the historical experience on Western Ukraine and argues that 'because of their past incorporation into various Central European states and empires ... there is a tendency for Western Ukrainians to perceive themselves to be "Europeans" and to espouse "European" views of political and economic processes'.<sup>28</sup>

Because of the ethnic dimension in Transylvania (ethnic Hungarians in the north and ethnic Germans in the south) the historical legacy is less uniform in this region than in Galicia (a point that we will address later). Nevertheless, Transylvania has traditionally been perceived, even during the communist period, as ethnically, culturally and politically different from the rest of the country. Therefore in order to assimilate Transylvania, nationalism was an important ideological component of Romanian communism, particularly under Ceaușescu.<sup>29</sup> He promoted a form of 'national populism' characterised by 'pseudo-egalitarianism and the non-recognition of any kind of diversity'.<sup>30</sup>

Nationalism was specifically directed at the country's Transylvanian ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic Hungarians and, to a much lesser extent, ethnic Germans. Throughout the 1970s Ceaușescu continued a policy of induced ethnic assimilation. Minority language instruction at the university level was discouraged and extremely limited. A policy instituted in the 1970s assigned university graduates to jobs, and this was used to bring about an influx of ethnic Romanians into Transylvania and to assign ethnic Hungarians to largely ethnic Romanian areas.<sup>31</sup> However, the unique culture of Transylvania persisted.

Not surprisingly, the only two episodes of popular uprisings before the 1989

revolution occurred in Transylvania (the 1977 miners' strike in the Jiu Valley and the 1987 workers' uprising in Braşov). If the former was motivated entirely by economic issues, the latter clearly had a political, anti-regime dimension. Two years later another popular uprising, which started in the Transylvanian city of Timişoara, eventually led to the regime's collapse. Interestingly, individuals in the less developed regions of the country were actually less inclined to join the revolution. Similarly, urbanisation alone cannot explain these events. Apart from Bucharest, all the uprisings occurred in the major Transylvanian cities. Equally large (or even larger) cities outside Transylvania were remarkably quiet. The most violent confrontations occurred in Sibiu and Braşov (about 100 individuals died in each city) and Timişoara (more than 70 individuals died). Furthermore, all these cities are located in Southern Transylvania.<sup>32</sup> and are the three major cities that once had the largest ethnic German minorities.<sup>33</sup>

*The influence of historical legacies on post-communist voting behaviour*

The comparative political science literature recognises that certain demographic variables are associated with voting. For example, variables such as education,<sup>34</sup> income and unemployment<sup>35</sup> have generally been found to correlate with Western voting patterns. As mentioned earlier, studies by Heyns & Bialecki and Pacek extended these studies to post-communist countries and confirmed a form of economic voting among post-communist electorates. While Heyns & Bialecki examined how economic voting accounted for the electoral success of Solidarity, Pacek examined how economic voting had punished incumbent reformers and provided former communist parties in countries such as Bulgaria with significant victories.

However, more recent studies by Powers & Cox and Harper have questioned whether voter choice and social cleavages can be explained by economic variables. Powers & Cox argue that in the case of Poland the understanding of the transition process (a type of historical legacy) influences voter choice.<sup>36</sup> We believe, however, that in the case of Galicia and Transylvania the historical legacy is not related to the transition process *per se*. Rather, we argue that the Austro–Hungarian legacy has left a lasting impression on these two regions.

A cursory examination of electoral returns from the 16 Transylvanian counties shows that there is a distinct voting pattern in this region. Even in the founding election of May 1990 in which the ruling National Salvation Front (FSN) won an overwhelming 67% of the lower house votes, Transylvanian counties were much less supportive of the FSN. In Transylvania as a whole the FSN received only 46% of the vote.<sup>37</sup> In those counties heavily populated by ethnic Hungarians the party received less than 12% of the vote.

This distinct voting pattern continued into the 1992 and 1996 national elections. However, the influence of the historical legacy on voting behaviour was not uniform within Transylvania. For example, Verdery notes that support for the Western and reform-minded Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) 'was weaker than it should have been in the most Westernised, developed, "European" part of the country: Transylvania, where long-term co-residence with Hungarians and Germans has both Europeanised Romanians and traumatised them on the ethnic question. There, many

[did] ... not vote for the Convention—too cozy with Hungarians—but, instead, for the Party of Romanian National Unity'.<sup>38</sup> Verdery's fundamental point is that there exists a liberal/nationalist cleavage within the regional voting of Transylvania.

In this region there exists a social cleavage between Romanian nationalists, ethnic Hungarian nationalists and (mostly Romanian) liberals. This cleavage structure is due to the legacy of ethnic relations in Transylvania. In the southern region there were always relatively few Hungarians.<sup>39</sup> The legacy of German culture makes the southern counties the most civic-minded in Transylvania and the entire country. Most of Romania's ethnic Hungarians live in Northern Transylvania, which has always had the potential for fuelling nationalist sentiments. While numerous surveys have shown Transylvania overall to be the most liberal region of the country, we argue that it is also the most nationalistic (a pre-communist and communist legacy).

While there is a nationalistic/liberal cleavage, populism has never elicited much support from Transylvanian voters. The Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) dominates Romanian politics outside Transylvania but has little success in Transylvania. For example, in the 1996 presidential run-off the challenger, Emil Constantinescu, represented a pro-Western coalition, including liberals, the CDR and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). He won all but one of the 16 Transylvanian counties, most of them by a wide margin. The incumbent president Ion Iliescu, an old *apparatchik*, was the candidate of the PDSR. He won all but four of the 25 counties outside Transylvania.

While many authors argue that it is the level of economic development that accounts for this voting cleavage, we believe that the structure is a function of the historical legacy of the region. We are not the first to make this argument. For example, Tismăneanu saw the 1996 election results as no less than 'electoral revolutions'. According to him, the result in Transylvania 'indicates the persistence of democratic, state-of-law memories and pluralist "habits of the heart" linked to the legacies of Central Europe'.<sup>40</sup> In the case of Galicia the pro-Western and pro-market Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) has little appeal outside Western Ukraine. Support for the radical nationalists (the National Front) is even more concentrated, limited to the three Galician *oblasti*. The populists (communists) are, similar to Romania's PDSR, the largest party in the country; however, they have very little support in the former Hapsburg provinces. Can the level of economic development or other socio-economic variables account for these differences between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine or Transylvania and the other Romanian regions or are the differences due to the historical legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? While authors like Tismăneanu point to the importance of the historical legacy, there has been no statistical analysis to examine the exact nature of the relationship between history and voting behaviour.

#### *Data and methods*

We examine the influence of several independent variables (e.g. historical legacy, percentage of ethnic minorities, percentage of urbanisation, education level and GDP) on voter choice. We operationalise the historical legacy independent variable by using a regional dummy variable. In the case of Ukraine the variable is simply the western

portion of the country. For Romania we distinguished between a northern and southern Transylvanian vote.

Like Pacek, we used aggregated voting data from the Romanian presidential run-offs in 1992, 1996 and 2000 and the 2000 Senate elections (here we examined the vote for the populist PDSR, the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the National Liberal Party (PNL)). We used multiple regression with weighted least squares to assess the relationship between voter choice and the ecological variables. The following model specifies the hypothesised relationship:

$$\text{Voter Choice } (Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Northern Transylvania} + \beta_2 \text{ Southern Transylvania} + \beta_3 \text{ Ethnic Hungarians} + \beta_4 \text{ Urbanisation} + \beta_5 \text{ Education} + \beta_6 \text{ GDP per capita}$$

In the case of Ukraine we analysed the *oblast*'-level vote for Leonid Kuchma in the 1994 and 1999 presidential run-offs, as well as the *oblast*'-level party list share of the vote for the pro-Western reformist Rukh and the Ukrainian Communist Party in the 1998 parliamentary elections. As in the case of the Romanian data, we used multiple regression with weighted least squares. The following model specifies the hypothesised relationship:

$$\text{Voter Choice } (Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Western Ukraine} + \beta_2 \text{ Ethnic Russians} + \beta_3 \text{ Urbanisation} + \beta_4 \text{ Education Index} + \beta_5 \text{ Life Expectancy Index.}$$

### *Discussion*

Table 1 presents the data analysis for the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections and the 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The data show that the regional effect in Ukrainian politics is significant and persistent over time. The adjusted  $R^2$  values average 0.81 for all four cases. The regional effect is significant in all three elections (indeed, it is the only variable that is consistently significant). The sign of the regional variable, however, changes from negative in the 1994 presidential run-off to positive in the 1999 run-off. However, the presidential run-off elections in 1994 and 1999 were markedly different. In the 1994 run-off the challenger, Leonid Kuchma, ran against the incumbent Leonid Kravchuk. In this run-off Kravchuk emphasised Ukrainian nationalism, whereas Kuchma (and his Inter-Regional Bloc for Reforms) 'adopted a position on the status of Russian language and regional autonomy which was nearly similar to that of the Communists', and furthermore the 'statehood issues were most important in these elections'.<sup>41</sup> The result was that Kuchma gained the ethnic Russian vote (ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers) but had very little support in the western region, the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism.

In 1999 the situation was completely different. In this election Kuchma's opponent was the Communist Party leader Petro Simonenko. By this time Kuchma's position on national issues had shifted since the 1994 election. Now he was regarded by the electorate as more pro-Western and nationalistic than his opponent. Therefore, the fact that the regional variable changes sign supports the argument that the regional variable reflects a Western historical legacy. Indeed, aside from the ethnic Russian variable, no other variables are significant in any of the elections. Therefore, the historical legacy exerts a more profound influence on presidential voter choice than

TABLE 1  
HISTORICAL LEGACY, ETHNICITY, DEVELOPMENT AND VOTE CHOICE: UKRAINE 1994–1999

	<i>Kuchma 1994<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Communist 1998<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Rukh 1998<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Kuchma 1999<sup>d</sup></i>
Constant	441.8* (192.5)	211.7* (89.0)	– 171.8* (71.7)	– 135.1 (94.6)
West <sup>e</sup>	– 41.1*** (9.1)	– 15.6** (4.2)	14.7*** (3.4)	40.4*** (4.5)
Russians <sup>f</sup>	0.70** (0.23)	0.42** (0.18)	– 0.02 (0.09)	– 0.10 (0.12)
Urbanisation <sup>g</sup>	– 0.25 (0.30)	– 0.11 (0.14)	0.04 (0.11)	0.27 (0.15)
Education index <sup>h</sup>	– 360.5 (266.1)	– 131.3 (123.3)	97.9 (99.2)	186.5 (130.8)
Life expectancy index <sup>i</sup>	– 81.3 (204.2)	– 91.5 (94.6)	127.3 (76.1)	1.5 (100.4)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.79	0.82	0.76	0.87

Notes: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ,  $N = 27$  *oblasti*.

<sup>a</sup> *Oblast'*-level percentage vote for Kuchma in the 1994 presidential election run-off.

<sup>b</sup> *Oblast'*-level percentage party list vote for the Communist Party in the 1998 parliamentary election.

<sup>c</sup> *Oblast'*-level percentage party list vote for Rukh in the 1998 parliamentary election.

<sup>d</sup> *Oblast'*-level percentage vote for Kuchma in the 1999 presidential election run-off.

<sup>e</sup> Dummy variable for Western Ukraine, coded 1 if the *oblast'* is located in Western Ukraine; 0 otherwise (Western Ukraine consists of seven *oblasti* including the three Galician *oblasti* Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, plus Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, Rivne and Volyn).

<sup>f</sup> Percentage of ethnic Russians in the *oblast'*.

<sup>g</sup> Percentage of the population living in urban areas.

<sup>h</sup> UNDP education index for the *oblast'* adult population.

<sup>i</sup> UNDP life expectancy index for the *oblast'* population.

Values in the table represent the  $b$  (unstandardised) coefficients of multiple regression with standard deviations provided in parentheses.

development variables such as education or urbanisation. In terms of the 1998 parliamentary elections, the regional variable is again significant and in the expected direction. The variable is negatively correlated with the communist vote and positively correlated with the pro-West Rukh (see Table 1).

For Romania, we again analyse these results at the regional (county) level and we find that, after controlling for the effect of socioeconomic development, the populist Ion Iliescu and the PDSR are much stronger outside Transylvania. As predicted, Transylvania is much more liberal and nationalistic in its orientation than the rest of the country. Table 2 presents the data analysis for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 presidential run-offs. The Northern and Southern Transylvania variables are statistically significant and negatively correlated with the Iliescu vote throughout all three elections. In 1992 and 1996 the Transylvania region voted overwhelmingly for the pro-Western reformer Constantinescu.

The average  $R^2$  for the three elections is an impressive 0.84. While education (1996 election) and urbanisation (2000 election) are also significant, these development variables are significant at a lower  $p$  value (0.05). In fact, because of multicollinearity between the development variables, the reported findings are a bit misleading. When we ran this model with just a single development variable, we found that it was statistically significant.<sup>42</sup> However, no matter how we specified the model, the

TABLE 2

HISTORICAL LEGACY, ETHNICITY, DEVELOPMENT AND VOTER CHOICE: ROMANIAN PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ELECTIONS (1992–2000)

	<i>Iliescu 1992<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Iliescu 1996<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Iliescu 2000<sup>c</sup></i>
Constant	108.3*** (10.9)	94.6*** (11.4)	91.9*** (10.7)
Northern Transylvania <sup>d</sup>	-9.4** (3.0)	-11.8** (3.1)	-17.0*** (2.9)
Southern Transylvania <sup>e</sup>	-17.6*** (2.5)	-15.3*** (2.6)	-11.7*** (2.5)
Hungarians <sup>f</sup>	-0.60*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.07)	0.53*** (0.06)
Urbanisation <sup>g</sup>	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.09)	0.16* (0.08)
Education <sup>h</sup>	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.56* (0.25)	-0.38 (0.23)
GDP per capita <sup>i</sup>	-0.01 (0.3)	0.2 (0.3)	-0.1 (0.3)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.93	0.89	0.70

Notes: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ,  $N = 41$  (the number of Romanian counties/electoral districts).

<sup>a</sup> County-level percentage vote for Iliescu in the 1992 presidential run-off.

<sup>b</sup> County-level percentage vote for Iliescu in the 1996 presidential run-off.

<sup>c</sup> County-level percentage vote for Iliescu in the 2000 presidential run-off.

<sup>d</sup> Dummy variable for Northern Transylvania, coded 1 for each of the nine counties (Bihor, Bistrita, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Maramureş, Mureş, Satu Mare and Sălaj), otherwise coded 0.

<sup>e</sup> Dummy variable for Southern Transylvania, coded 1 for each of the seven counties (Alba, Arad, Braşov, Caraş-Severin, Hunedoara, Sibiu and Timiş); otherwise coded 0.

<sup>f</sup> Percentage of ethnic Hungarians in the county (1992 census data).

<sup>g</sup> Percentage of the county population living in urban areas (1995).

<sup>h</sup> Percentage of the adult population with secondary and tertiary education (1992).

<sup>i</sup> Real GDP per capita (US dollars, computed on the basis of purchasing power parity based on 1995 data).

Values in the table represent the  $b$  (unstandardised) coefficients of multiple regression with standard deviations provided in parentheses.

regional variable was always statistically significant. Therefore, while development variables are important, it seems that the regional variable is one of the most important factors influencing voter choice. With that said, the ethnic Hungarian variable is also significantly and negatively correlated with the Iliescu vote in 1992 and 1996. Indeed, Shafir argues that in the 1996 run-off ethnic Hungarian voters were crucial to the success of Constantinescu.<sup>43</sup>

While the percentage of ethnic Hungarians in the region is negatively correlated with the Iliescu vote in 1992 and 1996, the sign of the vote changes in the 2000 run-off election. In this run-off ethnic Hungarians overwhelmingly supported Iliescu. This result is not surprising given that Iliescu's opponent was Corneliu Vadim Tudor of the nationalistic PRM. Tudor and the PRM espouse a chauvinistic, anti-Semitic and anti-Hungarian party platform. Therefore, when faced with a choice of Iliescu or Tudor, ethnic Hungarians chose the lesser of two evils and supported Iliescu. Tables 2 and 3 show that Transylvania as a region (whether southern or northern) was much

TABLE 3  
 HISTORICAL LEGACY, ETHNICITY, DEVELOPMENT AND VOTER CHOICE: ROMANIAN  
 2000 SENATE ELECTION

	<i>PDSR</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>PRM</i> <sup>b</sup>	<i>PNL</i> <sup>c</sup>
Constant	77.7*** (9.8)	9.2 (8.9)	4.5 (4.6)
Northern Transylvania <sup>d</sup>	- 17.0*** (2.7)	4.8 (2.4)	2.9* (1.3)
Southern Transylvania <sup>e</sup>	- 15.5*** (2.3)	1.7 (2.1)	3.1** (1.1)
Hungarians <sup>f</sup>	- 0.22*** (0.06)	- 0.29*** (0.05)	- 0.09** (0.03)
Urbanisation <sup>g</sup>	- 0.09 (0.07)	- 0.04 (0.07)	0.07* (0.03)
Education <sup>h</sup>	- 0.38 (0.21)	0.19 (0.19)	0.02 (0.1)
GDP per capita <sup>i</sup>	0.006 (0.2)	0.04 (0.2)	- 0.08 (0.1)
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.90	0.47	0.41

Notes: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ,  $N = 41$  (the number of Romanian counties/electoral districts).

<sup>a</sup> County-level percentage vote for the PDSR.

<sup>b</sup> County-level percentage vote for the PRM.

<sup>c</sup> County-level percentage vote for the PNL.

<sup>d</sup> Dummy variable for Northern Transylvania, coded '1' for each of the nine counties (Bihor, Bistrița, Cluj, Covașna, Harghita, Maramureș, Mureș, Satu Mare and Sălaj); otherwise coded 0.

<sup>e</sup> Dummy variable for Southern Transylvania, coded 1 for each of the seven counties (Alba, Arad, Brașov, Caraș-Severin, Hunedoara, Sibiu and Timiș); otherwise coded 0.

<sup>f</sup> Percentage of ethnic Hungarians in the county (1992 census data).

<sup>g</sup> Percentage of the county population living in urban areas (1995).

<sup>h</sup> Percentage of the adult population with secondary and tertiary education (1992).

<sup>i</sup> Real GDP per capita (US dollars, computed on the basis of purchasing power parity based on 1995 data).

Values in the table represent the *b* (unstandardised) coefficients of multiple regression with standard deviations provided in parentheses.

more supportive of Tudor and the PRM than many might have predicted. While the region does not respond to populist appeals, it is clear that there is a significant nationalistic dimension to Transylvanian voting (especially in the non-ethnic German area of Northern Transylvania). However, as Table 3 reports, the support for the pro-reform and Western PNL was not only positive but also statistically significant.

### Conclusions

Unlike the economic voting literature that finds that development variables are strongly associated with East European voting patterns, we find that the regional variable in Ukraine and Romania is highly correlated with voter choice. While the relationship between the regional variable and voter choice for pro-democratic and pro-Western parties in Ukraine is clear, the relationship between region and voter

choice for pro-democratic parties in Transylvania is more ambiguous. While the region strongly supported pro-democratic candidates in 1992 and 1996, the 2000 election demonstrates an important social cleavage within the region. We argue that the distinction within Transylvania has to do with the historical legacy of ethnic Germans in the south as opposed to ethnic Hungarians in the north. This pre-communist legacy combined with Ceauşescu's attempt to increase the number of ethnic Romanians in Transylvania has increased the level of Northern Transylvanian nationalism.

No matter how we specify the model or the regional variable, there are differences in Galicia and Transylvania that cannot be explained simply by development indicators. Rather, we believe that these differences are attributable to the historical legacy of these two regions. History does matter, but history's impact on a country is not always uniform. The historical legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has left a lasting impression on Galicia and Transylvania. This is not to deny the influence of development on voter choice; however, culture and history shape the perceptions of voters in regard to economic policies and their consequences. While others such as Powers & Cox have found that the transition history fundamentally influences voters' perceptions of policies and institutions, we find that even longer-term historical patterns influence post-communist voter choice.

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<sup>1</sup> The literature in this area has grown substantially over the last decade: see Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, 'Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They?', *Slavic Review*, 52, 1993, pp. 333–337; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists be Grounded?', *Slavic Review*, 54, 1995, pp. 111–127; Beverly Crawford & Arend Lijphart, 'Explaining Political and Economic Changes in Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures', *Comparative Political Studies*, 28, 1995, pp. 171–199; Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe C. Schmitter, 'From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?', *Slavic Review*, 54, 1995, pp. 965–978.

<sup>2</sup> For an excellent summary of the literature see Charles King, 'Post-Communism: Transition, Comparison, and the End of "Eastern Europe"', *World Politics*, 53, October 2000, pp. 143–172.

<sup>3</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Indeed, Bunce is critical of transitologists because of their over-emphasis on institutional choice at the expense of political culture. See Valerie Bunce, 'Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia', *Politics & Society*, 27, 1999, pp. 217–237.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Barbara Heyns & Ireneusz Bialecki, 'Solidarnosc: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?', *American Political Science Review*, 85, 1991, pp. 351–370.

<sup>7</sup> Alexander C. Pacek, 'Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe', *American Journal of Political Science*, 38, 1994, pp. 723–744.

<sup>8</sup> Marcus Harper, 'Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 33, 2000, pp. 1191–1227.

<sup>9</sup> Denise Powers & James H. Cox, 'Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland', *American Political Science Review*, 91, 1997, pp. 617–634.

<sup>10</sup> John T. Ishiyama, 'Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe', *Political Science Quarterly*, 112, 1997, pp. 95–115.

<sup>11</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies', *Party Politics*, 1, 1995, pp. 447–472.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 457.

<sup>13</sup> Western Ukraine consists of seven *oblasti*, including the three Galician *oblasti* (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil) and Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, Rivne and Volyn. Though Western Ukraine as a whole is markedly different from the rest of Ukraine, these differences are greatest in Galicia.

<sup>14</sup> The region of Transylvania includes the areas known as Crişana and the Banat (16 counties).

<sup>15</sup> Sarah Birch has written extensively on regional voting in Ukraine: see Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000); Sarah Birch, 'Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendums, 1989–1991', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 7, 1995, pp. 1145–1175; Andrew Wilson & Sarah Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, 6, 1999, pp. 1039–1068.

<sup>16</sup> The few works that have explored Romanian regional voting and more specifically Transylvanian voting include Pavel Câmpeanu, Ariadna Combes & Mihnea Berindei (eds), *România Înainte și după 20 Mai* (Bucharest, Humanitas, 1991); Petre Datculescu & Klaus Liepelt (eds), *Renașterea unei democrații: Alegerile din România de la 20 Mai 1990* (Bucharest, Coresi, 1991); Petre Datculescu, 'Cum a votat România: O analiză a alegerilor generale și prezidențiale de la 27 septembrie 1992', *Revista de Cercetări Sociale*, 1994, 1, pp. 1–5.

<sup>17</sup> Zoltán Szász, 'Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Hungarian Half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire', *Nationalities Papers*, 24, 1996, pp. 391–408.

<sup>18</sup> David A. Kideckel, *The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 127.

<sup>19</sup> The regions of Wallachia and Moldavia are known collectively as the Old Kingdom.

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Fischer-Galati, *20th Century Rumania*, 2nd ed (New York, Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Szász, 'Inter-Ethnic Relations', p. 392.

<sup>22</sup> John-Paul Himka, 'Western Ukraine in the Interwar Period', *Nationalities Papers*, 22, 1994, p. 347.

<sup>23</sup> Lavinia Stan & Lucian Turcescu, 'The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-communist Democratization', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52, 8, 2000, pp. 1467–1488.

<sup>24</sup> Tom Gallagher, 'Ceausescu's Legacy', *The National Interest*, 5, 1999, p. 108.

<sup>25</sup> Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages', p. 460.

<sup>26</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 35.

<sup>27</sup> Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and "Soft" Authoritarianism', in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrot (eds), *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine Belarus and Moldova* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 338–339.

<sup>28</sup> Sarah Birch, 'Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52, 6, 2000, p. 1017.

<sup>29</sup> Jonathan Eyal, 'Romania: A Hermit Under Pressure', *World Today*, 1989, 45, pp. 85–90.

<sup>30</sup> D.E.M. Mihas, 'Romania Between Balkan Nationalism and Democratic Transition', *Politics*, 17, 1997, p. 176.

<sup>31</sup> Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000).

<sup>32</sup> There are seven counties in this area including Alba, Arad, Braşov, Caraş-Severin, Hunedoara, Sibiu and Timiș.

<sup>33</sup> The 1930 census figures for the ethnic German minority in these counties are: Sibiu 32.8%, Timiș 31.8% and Braşov 19.1%. We do not have data for the southern Transylvanian cities, but considering the fact that Transylvanian ethnic Germans were mostly urban, it is likely that the percentages for the cities were even higher.

<sup>34</sup> G. Bingham Powell Jr, 'American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective', *American Political Science Review*, 80, 1986, pp. 17–44.

<sup>35</sup> Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30, 1986, pp. 315–346.

<sup>36</sup> Powers & Cox also find that religiosity has a significant influence on voter choice.

<sup>37</sup> This figure was computed by the authors from data reported by Alexandru I. Bejan, 'Prezentarea și analiza comparativă a rezultatelor alegerilor de la 20 mai 1990', in Petre Datculescu & Klaus Liepelt (eds), *Renașterea unei democrații: Alegerile din România de la 20 Mai 1990* (Bucharest, Coresi, 1991).

<sup>38</sup> Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 126–127.

<sup>39</sup> There are seven counties in Southern Transylvania. The percentage of ethnic Hungarians in this

area are: Arad 12%, Braşov 9.8%, Timiş 8.7%, Hunedoara 5.7%, Alba 5.6%, Sibiu 4.0% and Caraş-Severin 2%. These data are from the 1991 census.

<sup>40</sup> Vladimir Tismăneanu, 'Electoral Revolutions', *Society*, 35, 1997, p. 62.

<sup>41</sup> Sarah Birch, 'Electoral Systems, Campaign Strategies, and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994', *Political Studies*, 47, 1998, pp. 104, 113.

<sup>42</sup> Any socio-economic variable re-specified in the model was significant. Urbanisation, education and GDP per capita are all significant when included as a single variable in the re-specified model.

<sup>43</sup> Michael Shafir, 'Opting for Political Change', *Transition*, 12, 27 December 1996, pp. 12–17.

